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Welfare-oriented analyses of economic outcome measures such as income and wealth 
generally rest on the assumption of pooled and equally shared resources among all household 
members. Yet the lack of individual-level data hampers the distribution of income and wealth 
within the household context. Based on unique individual-level wealth data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), this paper challenges the implicit assumption of internal 
redistribution by considering an alternative definition of the aggregation unit and by controlling 
its effect on distribution and inequality analysis. We find empirical evidence for a significant 
gender wealth gap of about 30,000 euros in Germany, which amounts to almost 50,000 euros for 
married partners. Decomposition analyses reveal that this gap is mostly driven by differences in 
characteristics between men and women, the most important factor being the individual’s own 
income and labor market experience, and particularly so at the bottom and top of the wealth 
distribution. However, this finding can only be shown with non-parametric decomposition 
techniques. Differences for those in the middle of the distribution appear to be mostly driven by 
the wealth function, i.e., the way in which women transform their characteristics into wealth.  
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1.  Introduction 
Welfare-oriented analyses of economic outcome measures such as income and wealth 
generally rest on the assumption that household resources are pooled and shared equally 
among its members; or in a wider definition, that all individuals have equal control over these 
resources. Yet some studies have demonstrated that household and individual welfare are not 
the same (e.g., Phipps & Burton 1995), while the lack of individual-level data consistently 
hampers investigation of the income and wealth distribution within the household. The 
inability to differentiate asset ownership within the household forces many wealth studies to 
focus on differences in family structures (see, e.g., Zagorsky (1999), Yamokoski & Keister 
(2006), Schmidt and Sevak (2006), Sedo & Kossoudji (2004)). 
Due to the lack of the appropriate individual wealth data, empirical papers often rely 
on the implicit assumption of equally sharing wealth across members of the same households. 
This paper challenges this approach by considering an alternative definition of the 
aggregation unit and by controlling its effect on distribution and inequality analysis (including 
the decomposition of inequality). We use the unique individual level wealth data of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study and examine the existence of a gender wealth 
gap throughout the wealth distribution. Frick, Grabka, and Sierminska (2007) provide 
empirical evidence on the extent to which the implicit household internal wealth redistribution 
masks the ―true‖ degree of inequality within households: using households as the aggregation 
unit and applying per-capita household wealth to all household members yields a Gini 
coefficient for net worth of about .70, which is about 8% less than that obtained from 
individual wealth information (.76). For a more top-sensitive inequality measure like the half-
squared coefficient of variation, the reduction is much stronger: about 25%.  
In this paper, we use the semiparametric decomposition approach devised by DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to document disparities in individual wealth that exist between 
the sexes. To assess the sensitivity of our results, we compare them to those obtained using 
the decompositions developed by Oaxaca and Blinder (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) as well as 
by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). While our focus is on differentials within the household, 
we also document differences among other family types and by marital status (married, 
cohabiting, never married, widowed, and divorced) (see also Zagorsky 1999). Descriptive 
analyses provide evidence for a significant ―raw‖ gender wealth gap in Germany of 
approximately 30,000 euros, which widens to about 50,000 euros for men and women living   3 
in couple-headed households. Among married households, we find that only 15% of these 
declare an even distribution of assets, thus giving strong support for the need to collect and 
analyze wealth at the individual level.  
This paper is organized as follows: Focusing on gender-specific aspects, Section 2 
provides background information on wealth accumulation and reviews the relevant literature. 
Data and decomposition methods are described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 
gives the empirical results of the wealth decomposition. Section 6 concludes by pointing to 
open research questions.  
 
2.  Background information: Wealth accumulation and empirical evidence 
2.1. Differences in wealth accumulation 
In a simple model of accumulation, assets in period t+1   1  t A  can be expressed via the 
following equation  ) )( 1 ( 1 t t t t C Y A r A                 (1) 
where   r  is the gross rate of return on investments,   t Y  denotes income in period t 
and   t C  is consumption in period t.  
In this model, the assets in period t+1 may be different for several reasons. First, of all 
differences in saving   t t C Y   will result in a different accumulation of assets. The amount 
saved will in turn depend on the level of income, age and risk-aversion. For example, 
households with the same saving rate will have different outcomes if their saving patterns are 
based on different levels of income. Younger households are also expected to have 
accumulated less wealth (Modigliani and Brumberg (1954); Friedman (1957)) due to their 
different position in the life-cycle compared to the elderly. The presence of risk aversion will 
affects precautionary saving levels (Kimball (1990); Zeldes (1989)). Due to uncertainty about 
future income and in case of liquidity constraints that prevent a household from borrowing, 
risk-averse households are expected to accumulate additional wealth in order to prevent a 
future drop in consumption caused by a negative income shock. As a result, households may 
differ in saving rates depending on their preferences and current consumption needs in the 
presence of liquidity constraints.  
In addition, households differ in their preference for risk, which translates to different 
rates of return based on their preferred portfolio allocations. Via   r  in equation (1) these   4 
choices translate into different levels of assets in period t+1. Finally, households may enter 
the period with different stocks of assets (A), possibly due to inheritance resulting in 
differences in   1  t A . 
 
2.2. Gender differences in wealth accumulation 
Any persistent differences between women and men in the aforementioned factors will 
lead to gender differences in wealth accumulation. Empirical evidence indicates gender 
differences in many areas.  
First of all, women and men differ in their attachment to the labor market. According 
to Warren et al. 2001 any disadvantage in net worth is partly the result of lower female labor 
force participation The standard pattern is a continuous full-time labor market attachment for 
male breadwinners, while women tend to have part-time work arrangements (including 
potential wage penalties; see Bardasi and Gornick, 2008), often with more diversified work 
histories due to child bearing and child rearing and more frequent job changes (Berger and 
Denton, 2004). 
Differences in earnings are another potential source of the wealth gap. Given a 
persistent gender gap in earnings, even when holding savings rates constant, women are 
expected to accumulate lower levels of wealth (Blau and Kahn (1997, 2000) O’Neill (2003) 
Moore and Shierholz (2004)).  
There is evidence that women and men differ in the risk preference and hence, returns 
to savings as women invest more conservatively in their portfolios, which leads us to expect 
lower returns to wealth (Bajtelsmit and Van Derhei (1997), Hinz, McCarthy and Turner 
(1997), Jiankokopolos and Bernasek (1998)). Also Brush et al. (2002) find that a relative lack 
of social networks reduces women’s access to venture capital, thus leaving them out of this 
particular avenue of wealth creation.  
Authors have also extensively pointed out differences between women and men in the 
probability of owning a home. This is the most important component of the household wealth 
portfolio, additionally providing a flow of services and opportunities to accumulate wealth. 
One of the factors leading to gender differences in homeownership is discrimination in 
mortgage lending. Ladd (1998) found evidence of discrimination prior to the 1974 Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in explicit bank policies. More recently, Robinson (2002)   5 
found that gender and family structure discrimination depends on race. In the US, white 
couples face discrimination if the wife works, while African American couples face 
discrimination if the wife stays at home. These patterns also hold for households with a single 
female household head. White single mothers are at a relative disadvantage, while single 
African American mothers appear to be helped by the presence of children. The second 
barrier to homeownership for women is that women earn less than men on average and higher 
incomes are associated with an increased ability to save and with higher credit scores.  
Differences in family structures have been found to be important in explaining the 
gender wealth gap. For example, Sedo and Kossoudji (2004) find that married households are 
significantly more likely to own a home than non-married couple-headed households and 
other households [there may be an endogeneity problem here, since married individuals may 
exhibit characteristics similar to those of individuals who invest in owner-occupied housing]. 
They also find that family type is associated with further differences than just gender. Women 
are more likely than men to live in single-earner households with children (the majority of 
single parents are women) and are thus less likely to be wealthy. Schmidt and Sevak (2006) 
find large differences in observed wealth between single households and married couple-
headed households throughout the wealth distribution. They also find that single women hold 
significantly less wealth than single men. Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition they find 
that a significant portion of the wealth gap remains unexplained. They cannot identify wealth 
gaps by gender and family type for younger individuals (25-39 years old) and suggest that 
these emerge later in life. Mohanty (2004) examines wealth holdings after divorce using PSID 
data for the 1990s. She finds that single females hold significantly lower levels of wealth than 
single males. In this case, child support has a positive effect on women’s wealth after a 
divorce—after controlling for the economic and personal characteristics of her household. 
Levine, Mitchell, and Moore (2000) look at older households and find that non-married 
households are considerably less well-off than married couples, even after controlling for 
differences in household size. Using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the years 
before retirement, they also find sizeable gender gaps in both current and projected retirement 
income. Lupton and Smith (2003) also use the HRS to analyze the relationship between 
household type and asset accumulation, and also find that married households have more than 
twice the net worth of other types of households.    6 
Differences in marriage patterns among women and men also are found to make a 
difference in wealth accumulation. In a study by Wedgwood (1939), it was argued that the 
most important determinants for wealth endowments of women are marriage and inheritances, 
and this was confirmed by (Harbury and Hitchens 1977). In a more recent study, Zagorsky 
(1999) also finds that differences in wealth holdings are strongly affected by marital status. 
She finds that among the baby boomers (born between 1957 and 1964) women hold more 
assets on average than men. However, among unmarried households, men hold greater assets 
than women, while the household assets of married women tend to be greater than the 
household assets of married men. She explains this on the basis of gender differences in 
marriage patterns. Since women tend to marry men who are a few years older (Gibson, Le and 
Scobie (2006)), their households have had several additional years in which to accumulate 
wealth (including possible inheritances, which may also have a gender bias).  
When looking at gender differences in wealth, some studies compare men and women 
in one-person households only, because surveys typically collect wealth information at the 
household level only. Other studies focus on individual wealth components, where data such 
as pension wealth is available at the individual level (see Warren 2006). In many of the 
studies mentioned above, a major problem is that datasets on household wealth cannot assign 
asset ownership to one or the other spouse. Consequently, there has been little attempt to 
decompose wealth differentials by gender and there is not much that can be said about the 
financial well-being of married women (with respect to wealth holdings) although feminist 
economics emphasizes the importance of looking at intra-household inequality (Blumberg 
(1988); Haddad and Kanbur (1990); Phipps and Burton (1994); Sen (1990) and Woolley 
(1993), Pahl (2001), Allmendinger et al. (2006), Deere and Doss (2006)).  
One of the rare studies at the individual level is by Bolin and Pålsson (2001), utilizing 
wealth data for Sweden and examining the importance of family structure on wealth 
accumulation. They find that cohabiting and married women are compensated for lost 
opportunities in the labor market by larger shares of the family’s non-human wealth being 
assigned to them.  
When looking at the different levels of wealth accumulation between men and women 
in general and within married couples in particular, one should also consider the institutional 
and legal environment providing the setting for accumulation. A good example is divorce law, 
which can significantly affect the net worth of a former marriage. As such it is important to   7 
note that the legal regulations in Germany and many other European countries consider joint 
ownership of assets (and debts) only for those wealth components acquired during marriage. 
Wealth accumulated prior to marriage will remain in the hands of the original owner and will 
not be affected by a divorce. Inheritances during marriage are also not considered to be 
accumulated jointly and thus will remain fully in the hands of the successor. However, this is 
true for the (monetary value) of the original inheritance only and excludes capital gain or 
added value. Marriage contracts can also be designed to deviate from these standard 
regulations in divorce law. Thus, to test the actual equal sharing of resources within the family 
it is important to know which partner has the factual command over wealth given that in case 
of a divorce only the jointly accumulated wealth will be evenly split among the partners.  
In this paper we have the unique opportunity to examine this aspect of household 
behavior by having individual ownership information of various subcomponents of wealth 
within households using the 2002 wealth module of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP).  
 
3.  Data  
The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a representative longitudinal survey of 
individuals living in private households in Germany (Wagner et al. 2007). The survey was 
started in 1984 in West Germany and was extended to East Germany in 1990. The initial 
sample included over 12,000 respondents, with everyone aged 17 and over in sample 
households being interviewed. In the years 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2006, new sub-
samples were drawn which approximately doubled the initial sample size. The sample 
analyzed here comprises approximately 12,700 households with about 24,000 respondents 
(plus their children) surveyed in the year 2002. In that year, a specific section of the 
individual questionnaire focused on information about wealth.  
Respondents were asked to provide seven different wealth and debt components:  
o  owner-occupied property (and associated debt)  
o  other property (and associated debt),  
o  financial assets,  
o  private pensions (including life insurance and building savings contracts),  
o  business assets,  
o  tangible assets, and    8 
o  consumer credits.  
Potential shortcomings of this rather comprehensive questionnaire arise from the 
exclusion of cars in the measure of tangible assets and the lack of information about pension 
entitlements both from company pensions and from the statutory social pension fund in 
Germany (―Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung‖). The latter information is difficult to obtain 
through surveys because entitlements from these two security systems are not well known. A 
further restriction comes from the use of a lower threshold of 2,500 euros for financial and 
tangible assets and for consumer credits. This was introduced to reduce the burden on 
respondents by not asking them to state (rather) negligible amounts. As such, the overall 
measure of total wealth and the share of wealth holders are likely to be somewhat understated 
and biased against very small wealth holdings. A further restriction of the SOEP 2002 wealth 
questionnaire arises due to the lack of wealth information on children. SOEP collects wealth 
information from respondents starting at the age of 17. Thus any wealth held by younger 
persons is not considered here—although it may have been captured if a household-based 
questionnaire was used. In any case, given the minor relevance of wealth holdings by children 
this aspect can be neglected. 
A more serious problem in collecting (representative) wealth data at the micro-level is 
measurement error from various sources such as rounding, misreporting and very likely 
underreporting (e.g., financial assets), and particularly because of non-response (see, e.g., 
Riphahn & Serfling 2005). On the one hand, asking separately all adult household members 
instead of just one reference member may increase the probability of getting all wealth 
components of all household members, as well as a better estimate of the true wealth of each 
individual. On the other hand, however, this also increases the probability of inconsistent 
information (e.g., two partners providing non-matching information on the very same issue 
such as a commonly owned home). With respect to missing information due to item non-
response on wealth questions, the non-participation of a household reference person results in 
completely missing data, while the non-participation of one individual results only in partially 
missing data. Nevertheless, coping with all these measurement problems is a major task. In 
case of the SOEP wealth data used here, inconsistencies have been taken care of by means of 
editing on a case-wise basis, while missing data due to item non-response as well as partial 
unit non-response (i.e., non-responding individuals in otherwise responding households) have   9 
been corrected for by multiple imputation techniques, explicitly considering the potential 
selectivity of the underlying missing mechanisms.
1  
Despite these shortcomings and empirical problems, when the total wealth of private 
households measured by SOEP 2002 is compared to corresponding aggregated information 
from national balance sheets, the survey does quite well (see Frick, Grabka and Sierminska 
(2007)). Housing wealth components match very well as do net business assets. The biggest 
discrepancy is for the more heterogeneous categories financial assets and tangible assets, but 
in these two cases the questions ask to only report balances over 2500 euros and, more 
relevant, do not refer to all the components found in the aggregates included in the national 
balance sheets. The overall value of ―financial assets‖ owned by a given person might consist 
of numerous single items and forgetting one of those yields a higher probability of 
understating the true value. This is less likely in the case of housing wealth, given that most 
people will not hold more than one home. Nevertheless, the coverage of financial assets as a 
percent of national balance sheet aggregates is as high as 50% (see Frick, Grabka, and Marcus 
2007), which is a very good result when compared to other surveys contained in the 
Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) besides the SOEP (see 
http://www.lisproject.org/lwstechdoc.htm and Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding (2006)).  
 
4.  Methods 
After providing more descriptive information and bivariate analyses on wealth 
endowments and inequality by gender and marital status (see Section 5 below) we will invest 
in a gender decomposition concentrating on males and females living in partnerships (married 
or cohabiting).
2 For sensitivity purposes we will apply various decomposition techniques, as 
each of them exhibits certain strengths and weaknesses.  
4.1.  The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
We first use the Blinder-Oaxaca method to decompose the mean difference of wealth 
between men and women into portions attributable to differences in the distribution of 
endowments (explanatory variables) and differences in returns to these endowments 
                                                 
1 See Frick, Grabka, and Marcus 2007 for an extensive description of the editing and imputation routines and 
Frick, Grabka and Sierminska 2007 for an assessment of the impact of such post-survey data treatment on 
substantive research results such as wealth composition and inequality.   
2 For an introduction to various decomposition methods consult Jenkins and Van Kerm (forthcoming).    10 
(coefficients, conditional expectation functions) (see Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). While this 
method is a very popular decomposition technique, it requires a parametric assumption to be 
made about the form of the conditional expectation function. This assumption often leads to 
misspecification error because it incorrectly captures the relationship between the dependent 
and the explanatory variables for the two groups to be differentiated (here: gender). It is thus 
likely to result in biased inferences regarding the portion attributable to differences in the 
distribution of explanatory variables (Barsky et al. 2001) particularly if the range over which 
the explanatory variables are defined differs for the groups under consideration. We test the 
extent to which this is the case in our sample of individuals living in marriage or cohabiting 
by alternatively specifying two reference groups.  
The general specification for the Oaxaca decomposition is the following: 
] )][ ( ) ( [ ] )[ ( )] ( ) ( [
) , ( W M W M W M W W W M W M X X X X X                      (2) 
The first component captures differences due to characteristics, the second due to 
coefficients (estimated effects) and the third term is the interaction between coefficients and 
endowments. A discussion of alternative decomposition equations distinguishing different 
reference groups can be found in appendix A.1.  
 
4.2. The Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce decomposition 
The Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (JMP) (1993) decomposition method extends the 
Oaxaca decomposition by taking into account the residual distribution. The innovation in the 
JMP extension is to decompose the ―unexplained‖ or ―residual‖ portion of the gap from the 
Oaxaca decomposition into price and quantity components. In other words, this technique 
maintains the component of Oaxaca’s decomposition which captures the wealth differential 
due to the differences in characteristics (endowments), but the second component (due to 
differences in coefficients) is divided into two effects: one reflects the wealth differential 
attributable to the respective mean percentile ranks (interpreted as the level of unobserved 
ability) and the second part captures the differential due to wealth dispersion (interpreted as 
ability prices or individual characteristic prices), which in this case we could interpret as 
differences in the wealth function (―discrimination‖). (More technical details on the JMP 
method can be found in Appendix A.2.).   11 
One should be careful when interpreting these components. The components used as 
an indicator of the level of unobserved abilities could be due as much to an unobserved 
characteristic as to the simple omission of explanatory variables. Second, as we are making 




4.3. Nonparametric Methods for Group Comparisons 
In order to avoid making an assumption about the functional form of the conditional 
expected wealth function we make use of a decomposition technique introduced by DiNardo, 
Fortin, Lemieux (1996) and used, for example, by Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006). The 
idea is to use reweighting techniques to identify various counterfactual distributions that allow 
us to determine the contribution of specific components to the overall gap. In this case, we 
partition the vector of wealth determinants into four groups: (1) labor market experience, (2) 
education level, (3) intergenerational characteristics, and (4) demographic characteristics. The 
first group includes indicators on the current labor market status (self-employed, not in the 
labor force, whether over 65 years of age). While the second set of variables focuses on the 
individual’s educational attainments, the intergenerational group includes information on the 
education of the mother and father and on inheritances received in recent years. The final set 
of variables on demographic characteristics contains indicators of good and bad health, the 
number of children up to five years of age living in the household, having lived in East 
Germany in 1989 at the fall of the Wall, migration background, and living with a partner (see 
Appendix A3 for a more detailed description of the variables)  
The specification of the wealth gap as a function of the four groups of variables can be 
written in the following way: 
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [
) ( ) (
4 4 3
3 2 2 1 1
) , (
w g w g w g w g
w g w g w g w g w g w g
w g w g g
W
CF CF CF
CF CF CF CF CF
M
W M W M
   
      
   
        (3) 
The first component captures the effect of differences in labor market experience 
distribution on the gender wealth gap; the second component captures the effect of differences 
between men and women with respect to education; the third effect results from differences in 
                                                 
3 Suen (1997) demonstrates that this decomposition yields biased results if the position in the distribution is not 
independent of its standard deviation.    12 
intergenerational characteristics; and the fourth effect from demographic differences. The last 
term refers to the differences between the conditional wealth functions for men and women. 
(A detailed discussion of the construction of counterfactuals is in Appendix A.3.) Whereas the 
decomposition following the Blinder-Oaxaca approach focuses on the mean counterfactual, 
this nonparametric approach examines the distributional counterfactual. The nonparametric 
approach also allows researchers to avoid making parametric assumptions, which is also 
important when one is interested in looking at the whole distribution. 
Finally, we compare our results obtained from the three different decomposition 
methods and examine the value added as well as the cross-technique consistency of the 
respective results.  
 
5.   Results 
5.1. Descriptive Findings  
In the following section, we investigate gender differences in wealth holdings for 
adults (17 years and older) only, explicitly considering the composition of the person’s 
household. Basic non-wealth characteristics can be found in Table 1, separately for gender 
and split by marital status. The rationale for explicitly contrasting these non-wealth 
characteristics by gender is simply that a possible gender wealth gap may result from 
differential endowment with certain characteristics rather than from gender per se. This will 
also be crucial to the gender decomposition analysis that follows.  
The women in the sample are slightly older, both overall and in most of the marital 
status subgroups except married and cohabiting. This reflects that among German couples, 
men still tend to be about three years older on average than their female partners. Men have 
higher individual labor income in all groups, but particularly divorced and widowed men. 
About 7 percentage points more men than women obtained higher education. Among married 
couples this difference increases to ten percent. Men are more likely to be employed full-time 
and to be self-employed. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be employed part-time 
(13.5% versus 2% for men) or not employed (42.5% versus 25.7 % for men). This 
employment gap is much more pronounced for married than for cohabiting women. All of 
these findings can be taken as indications of continued conservative marriage behavior among 
men and women, confirming the typical pattern of the male-breadwinner model within   13 
German couples: on average, men are married to younger, less-educated women who work 
less than full-time, but who—given the relatively low German inheritance taxes—eventually 
profit from their late husband’s wealth accumulation. Strikingly, even in the group of 
individuals who have never been married, women are less likely to be employed full-time 
(29.4% versus 37.4% for men) and not employed (13.3% versus 6.6%), although there are no 
substantial differences in education and income. Finally, more women than men recently 
received an inheritance, but their inheritances are also lower than men’s. 
Table 2 summarizes wealth holdings among men and women differentiated by marital 
status. On average, men hold about 30,000 euros more than women. This gap is about 9,000 
euros when we look at the median and is present in all household types defined by marital 
status. Figure 1 presents net worth measures by gender and marital status including 95% 
confidence bands: it is only among the widowed and never-married singles that we do not 
find significant gender wealth gaps. Interestingly, German widows are the wealthiest group 
among all women, perhaps profiting from the aforementioned inheritance regulations and 
their longer life expectancy. On the other hand, looking at those currently married, the wealth 
gap is particularly large with about 47,000 euros. This may come as a surprise: we would 
expect a more even split among people ―sharing their lives.‖ Actually, a substantial part of 
welfare–oriented research relies on the assumption of pooling and equal sharing of resources, 
an assumption that is driven by the lack of appropriate data, among other things. The 
availability of individual microdata in the German SOEP provides us with a unique 
opportunity to compare individual and aggregated wealth information and thus to examine 
whether the equal sharing assumption is adequately reflected in the data.  
In the following, our analysis focuses on individuals living in marriages or cohabiting 
partnerships. The wealth variable we use is net worth, which consists of wealth bound in 
principal residence, other property, financial assets, insurance and private pensions, business 
assets, tangible assets, and debt. Net worth is top-coded at the 99
th percentile (at 925,000 
euros) and bottom-coded at the 1
st percentile (at –100,000 euros). After establishing some 
descriptive facts about the wealth gap, we move on to disclose some reasons for these 
differences including wealth decomposition by gender, based on the methodologies described 
above.  
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5.2. Some Facts about “Equal Sharing” among Couples in Germany 
The extent to which we observe equal sharing among married and cohabiting couples 
in Germany is first assessed in a descriptive manner. We do so by defining an indicator 
variable equal to [-1], [0], and [1] if wealth reported in the household by females is [greater 
than], [equal to], and [less than] that of males and equal to [9] if no wealth is reported in the 
household. We will refer to these households as  
  ―Female-in-charge (F>M),‖  
  ―Equal sharing (F=M),‖  
  ―Male-in-charge (M>F),‖ and  
  ―No wealth‖, respectively.
4  
In Table 3a we find the breakdown of the different types of ―sharing couple-headed 
households‖ by wealth quantiles. Only about 15% of couples experience equal sharing within 
their households. In 26% of households, the woman reports holding more wealth than the 
male counterpart and in nearly 50% percent of the couple-headed households, men report 
holding more wealth. There are no substantial differences in this reporting across the wealth 
distribution. The ―male-in-charge‖ type of household is on average equally present in the 2
nd 
to the 5
th quantile. In the bottom wealth quantile, only 20% of the households are of this type, 
but this result is driven by the inclusion of couples with no wealth (47% of those in the lowest 
quintile or 10% of the population in couple-headed households).  
The average wealth gap, i.e., the absolute difference in wealth holdings by men and 
women, is 27,967 euros in favor of men (Table 3b). An average gap of this magnitude or 
larger can be found in households in the top two quantiles of the wealth distribution while in 
the bottom three quantiles the gap is much lower. In households of the ―men-in-charge‖ type, 
the gap is about 30% larger than the respective gap in female-in-charge type of households. 
This results from the fact that men on average hold more assets in each of the wealth quantiles 
than their respective female counterpart. In other words, men in female-in-charge households 
will hold more assets then their female counterpart in male-in-charge households (Table 3c 
and 3d). The one exception is the bottom quantile of the distribution.  
                                                 
4 Obviously, one could define these groups also based on a less strict cut-off, e.g., male and female wealth might 
be considered ―equal‖ if those values do not deviate by more than x percentage points. Robustness checks have 
shown that the substantive findings described here do not change in a significant way when choosing various 
values for x.   15 
In order to determine the driving forces behind this phenomenon, we considered 
various hypotheses. First, we compared the portfolio composition between men and women. 
A summary of the differences is provided in Table 4. We find that among the married and 
cohabiting group, men on average hold more wealth of each of the components, but there is a 
particularly large difference for business assets (Edland & Kopczuk 2007). The higher 
prevalence of self-employed males has already been identified in Table 1.  
The disparities in the value of owner-occupied homes appear to be less pronounced for 
married
5 and cohabiting couples (Table 4) compared to other components of the wealth 
portfolio. In fact, homeownership seems to exert an equalizing effect given that it is most 
prevalent among the ―equal sharing‖ households in general (two-thirds of those observations 
live in owner-occupied housing) as well as in almost every quintile of the wealth distribution 
(Table 3e). 
 
5.3. Decomposing the Wealth Gap  
In the following section, we apply three different methods to decompose the gender 
wealth gap. It must be noted that in this paper, we do not compare men and women within the 
very same partnership or marriage but rather look at all married or cohabiting men and 
women, respectively. Nevertheless, this analysis is thought of as a first necessary step towards 
an investigation of the true intra-partnership wealth distribution. 
The standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition concentrates on the mean of the variable 
of interest. Although easy to interpret, the disadvantage of this method is that it requires the 
assumption of a linear specification, which may bias the decomposition results. For this 
reason, second, we apply the decomposition method proposed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
(1993), which allows us to analyze the gender wealth gap at different points of the 
distribution. Third, to examine whether factors like labor market experience, educational 
level, and intergenerational and demographic characteristics affect the dispersion, we adopt 
the methods presented by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). 
 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, housing equity of married men is about 14% higher than that of women. This difference is 
statistically significant.    16 
5.3.1.  Net worth for women and men  
The results presented above suggest that the average wealth difference of about 
28,000 euros in households with couples can be explained by many covariates, but only to a 
certain extent. We examine the effect of these covariates by using regression analysis for 
women and men separately (see Table 5)
6. According to these results, once we control for the 
length of marriage, only full-time labor market experience and permanent income have a 
significantly different effect for men and women in couple-headed households on the 
currently accumulated stock of net worth. Controlling for the length of marriage also reverses 
the magnitude between men and women of the variable indicating having a mother with 
higher education. Nevertheless, the effect of having a father with higher education remains 
significantly different for men and women with the effect on women’s accumulated wealth 
being five times stronger than for men. The rest of the covariates have the expected effect. 
The number of marriages, being an immigrant and having lived in East Germany before 1989 
exert a significantly negative effect on net worth. While having high education, being over 65 
and having high job autonomy has a positive effect. Having received an inheritance has a 
significant and strong effect on wealth for both men and women. Finally, it should be noted 
that—conditional on the choice of covariates—the overall explanatory power of our model is 
much greater for men than for women: the R-squared of the estimation for men is 29% vs. 
only 18% in the model for women. 
 
5.3.2.  The Blinder-Oaxaca method  
We now turn to the analysis of the gender wealth gap using the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition approach. The wealth gap between male and female partners depends on three 
factors: differences in observable characteristics (e.g., education, number of children, life 
work experience, health, immigrant status, education of parents, inheritance), differences in 
coefficients across the two groups (e.g., differences in how the characteristics translate into 
wealth based on the wealth function), and unobservables. Table 6 presents two different sets 
of results. In the top part of the table, the results treat women as the reference group and in the 
bottom men are the reference group. In other words, the mean outcome difference can be 
expressed in the following way: 
                                                 
6 We explore various specifications of the wealth function. These gender-specific regression results can be found 
in Appendix Tables B.2a for men and B.2b. for women, respectively. The results given in Table 5 correspond to 
those of specification (8).    17 
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where men are the reference group. 
j ) (  is the conditional mean function for 
j=[Woman, Man] and 
j  -coefficents for j-group and 
j X characteristics of j group. The 
explanation of these components can be found in Appendix A.1. According to the results 
presented in the top panel of Table 6, close to 70% of the gap is explained by differences in 
characteristics between male and female partners. If women had the exact same characteristics 
as men, their average wealth would increase by about 20,000 euros to almost 100,000 euros. 
Interestingly enough, if men’s characteristics translated into wealth in the same way as 
women’s characteristics do, the average wealth holdings of men would be 125,200 euros 
instead of 107,761 euros. This is an indication for women deriving ―more wealth‖ from their 
own characteristics than they would be able to derive if they had the same parameters as men.  
Examining the three-fold decomposition according to Blinder-Oaxaca (Table 7) we 
find that in fact, women’s wealth function (the differences in coefficients) compensates for 
the differences in characteristics almost entirely when the model for men is chosen as the non-
discriminatory model. This could not be seen in the two-fold decomposition. As shown in 
Table 7, women’s average wealth, if they had men’s characteristics and wealth functions, 
would be 98 400 euros versus their actual 79,562 euros. The panel shows that although the 
gap can be decomposed into the portion explained by differences in characteristics and 
differences in coefficients, the unexplained portion (―Interaction‖ in Table 7)—that can be 
interpreted as discrimination—is of similar magnitude to the wealth gap.  
 
5.3.3.  The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce method 
The Blinder-Oaxaca method provided us with the mean outcome difference due to 
endowments, coefficients, and interactions between these two measures. In the method 
proposed by Juhn, Murphy, Pierce (1993) and also used by Blau and Kahn (1996), two 
hypothetical wealth distribution functions are created that allow us to isolate the gender 
differences due to differences in characteristics, differences in the wealth function between   18 
men and women, as well as an unexplained portion that is due to unobservable skill between 
men and women together with the current market value of this unobservable skill measured 
by equation residuals (see Appendix A.2). We consider three alternative types of measures of 
these wealth distributions: first, the mean wealth gap that corresponds to the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition; second, the wealth gap at various percentiles of the distribution; and third, 
differences in wealth dispersion as measured by the wealth gap between various percentiles. 
The results of the mean gap decomposition are given in Table 8. Assuming the male 
group as the reference group (upper panel), we find that more than 45,000 euros of the gap is 
due to differences in characteristics suggesting that average women’s wealth would exceed 
that of men’s if they both had the same characteristics according to the JMP decomposition. 
The negative sign on the ―gap due to differences in coefficients‖, i.e., the way women 
translate their characteristics into wealth, suggests that this has a diminishing effect on the 
wealth gap. In this non-parametric decomposition method, the unexplained portion is quite 
small compared to the parametric Oaxaca-Blinder method. The bottom panel confirms the 
results.  
Examining the wealth gap at different points in the distribution, we find, not 
surprisingly, that it increases as we move up the wealth distribution (see Table 9). It is 18,250 
at the median and more then three times as large at the 90th percentile with almost 68,000 
euros. Across the distribution, most of the gap stems from the differences in characteristics 
between men and women, rather than from differences in the way in which—conditional on 
their characteristics—men and women have accumulated their wealth in the past. Although 
wealth parameters do matter, particularly at the bottom of the distribution, with increasing 
wealth there is a distinct increase in the explanatory relevance of the difference in 
characteristics and a reduction in the role of the differences in the wealth function. The 
unexplained portion of the wealth also becomes smaller for the wealthier. For the bottom half 
of the distribution it has a reducing effect on the gap. 
Looking at the 90-50 decile ratio (lower panel of Table 9), over half of the differences 
in wealth dispersion in the two distributions as measured by the wealth gap can be explained 
by differences in characteristics. As such, in the upper part of the distribution differences in 
characteristics exert an increasing effect on the wealth gap while according to the results for 
the 50-10 decile ratio these have a reducing effect on the gap. Over 50% of the gap also 
remains unexplained. The differences in the wealth function account for a sizeable part of the   19 
gap in the lower part of the wealth distribution. This might be interpreted in such a way that 
the gap among wealthy persons is driven by differences in characteristics between men and 
women whereas differences in wealth functions are more relevant among the less wealthy.  
 
5.3.4.  The DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux method 
By using the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux approach we avoid making any parametric 
assumptions about the distribution function and consider comparisons of the whole 
probability density function. We group the explanatory variables into four groups: (1) labor 
market experience, (2) education level, (3) intergenerational characteristics, and (4) 
demographic characteristics.
7 These factors correspond closely to the list of potential sources 
of wealth differences among men and women. Similarly to Cobb-Clark & Hildebrand (2006) 
and Gibson, Le, and Stillman (2007), the results presented here are obtained by calculating all 
relevant counterfactuals and then taking the simple average over all possible decompositions. 
The results for the raw wealth gap correspond to those presented for the JMP decomposition 
in Table 9, although the decompositions according to DFL differ as they are done sequentially 
according to the four factor groups (Table 10).  
In many cases, the gap is the result of differences in current income and experience in 
the labor market and not as much related to the other characteristics such as education. The 
effect of labor market experience is found to be strong at the median and at the top of the 
distribution, whereas at the bottom of the wealth distribution education plays a somewhat 
stronger role. For most of the distribution, neither intergenerational nor demographic 
characteristics add significantly to the explanation of the gender wealth gap. However, a very 
large part of the gap results from the differences in how men and women have accumulated 
their wealth—conditional on their characteristics—i.e., differences in their wealth function, 
which is included in the ―unexplained‖ column of Table 10. This effect is particularly strong 
in the middle of the wealth distribution [see interquartile range P75-P25], whereas—in line 
with the results on JMP—at the top of the wealth distribution [see P90-P50] the driving 
factors are differences in characteristics (here: especially income and labor market 
experience). Finally, in the lower half of the wealth distribution [see P50-P10] the large and 
positive effect of income and labor market experience is dampened by a negative impact of 
the unexplained part.  
                                                 
7 See Appendix A3 for a short description of the indicators used.   20 
 
5.3.5.  Comparison of results derived from various decomposition techniques  
Both the Oaxaca-Blinder and Juhn-Murphy-Pierce methods confirmed that the average 
wealth gap results from differences in characteristics between men and women and that the 
wealth gap would even have been marginally larger if the wealth function for the two groups 
had been identical. The way women accumulate wealth has a reducing effect on the gap. This 
was confirmed to be true across the wealth distribution (Table 9). In absolute terms, the 
unexplained portion of the gap rises as we move up the wealth distribution. In the DiNardo, 
Fortin, Lemieux method we specify the different factors that could help explain the 
differences in the wealth gap. Here we find that the observable characteristics play a large role 
in accounting for the gap (particularly individual income and labor market experience) which 
is consistent with the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce method only at the top of the distribution. In our 
analysis, we also check the robustness of the results by excluding the self-employed given 
that they also accumulate wealth to provide themselves security at a later age. We find our 
main results remain unchanged with magnitudes of the effects becoming smaller (results 
available from the authors).
8  
 
6.  Conclusions 
A main obstacle to the analysis of gender wealth gaps in the empirical literature is the 
lack of comprehensive wealth information at the individual level (Deere and Doss, 2006). 
This gap in the literature can be tackled using the 2002 wealth module of the German SOEP, 
which contains wealth data on about 23,000 individuals. We find clear empirical indications 
of a significant gender wealth gap of about 30,000 euros, which amounts to almost 50,000 
euros for partners in married couples. We find that overall only about 15% of all couples have 
equal sharing within their households. In 26% of households, the woman reports having more 
wealth than her male partner and in nearly 50% men report more wealth.  
Using various decomposition methods (Oaxaca-Blinder, Juhn-Murphy-Pierce, and 
DiNardo, Fortin, Lemieux) we find a robust picture of the wealth gap being mostly driven by 
                                                 
8 As women’s labor market experience has changed across cohorts it is plausible that it’s effect on the wealth gap 
varies,as well. As a check, we address this issue by performing the DFL decomposition on a sample of younger 
and older households. The conclusions obtained from the whole sample remain valid in this case although the 
raw gap is lower for the younger cohorts and understandably, the role of intergenerational factors is also smaller 
for this group. The effect of education is relatively stronger for the older population (results available from 
authors).   21 
differences in characteristics between men and women. By far the most important factor is the 
individual’s own income and labor market experience particularly for the bottom and top of 
the wealth distribution. However, this finding can only be shown with the non-parametric 
JMP and DFL methods due to the mean-orientation of the parametric Oaxaca-Blinder 
technique. Differences for those in the middle of the distribution seem to appear to be mostly 
driven by the way women transform their characteristics into wealth, i.e., the wealth function.  
Future research will have to focus more closely on wealth differentials between male-
female couples living in the same household. To shed more light on the intra-partnership 
wealth variation, we also need to control for gender-specific marriage patterns, and 
consequently, to analyze the wealth gap as a function of within-partnership variation with 
respect to age, education, income, employment status, etc. Such an approach, however, 
demands extensive microdata as well as the consideration of the institutional framework, 
especially in Germany with its well developed public pension system. As shown above, 
individual wealth holdings depend crucially on employment status: self-employed individuals 
who are not covered by the statutory public pension scheme have to invest in private old age 
provisions. Consequently, we find this group to be much better off in our wealth measure, 
which ignores an individual’s public pension entitlements. Obviously, within partnerships, 
wealth holdings as well as plans for further accumulation will vary by both partner’s 
employment status and consequently by whether or not a person is accumulating their own 
public pension entitlements. Due to the prominence of the male breadwinner model in 
Germany, the effect of considering individual pension entitlements on the intra-partnership 
wealth gap will very likely increase. The analyses and results presented in this paper based on 
financial and real assets may be seen as a first and necessary step towards achieving a more 
comprehensive understanding of the gender wealth gap.    22 
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8.  Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Basic non-wealth characteristics by gender and marital status, Germany 2002 
 



































Demographics                           
Age (in years)   47.1  53.3  39.2  50.2  70.7  30.5  49.4  50.2  36.9  53.2  73.9  32.0  48.3 
% Immigrant    11.8  14.3  5.1  12.0  6.5  8.6  11.2  14.1  5.5  10.7  8.7  7.5  11.5 
% Foreign 
citizenship  8.1  9.7  3.1  7.5  0.8  7.2  6.7  9.0  2.8  5.7  2.6  5.2  7.4 
Household size   2.60  2.93  2.49  1.24  1.19  2.37  2.47  2.93  2.48  1.77  1.25  2.35  2.53 
Number of children 
< 17  0.47  0.64  0.39  0.07  0.04  0.25  0.47  0.64  0.38  0.44  0.04  0.37  0.47 




20,788  21,877  20,375  20,531  17,613  18,712  18,915  21,355  19,086  14,182  14,782  17,091  19,790 
Relative Post-Govt. 




22,952  26,139  24,459  25,862  5,272  15,975  10,019  9,827  17,092  12,714  2,249  11,711  16,063 
Relative labor 
income position  143  163  152  161  33  99  62  61  106  79  14  73  100 
Education                            
low (isced=0.1.2)  17.6  13.1  9.4  15.3  19.1  32.1  26.1  22.0  17.0  24.3  41.1  33.2  22.1 
middle (isced=3)  47.9  47.7  53.2  49.3  59.2  44.9  47.9  51.2  47.0  45.3  45.7  40.9  47.9 
(higher) vocational 
(isced=4.5)  13.1  13.7  17.6  11.2  10.5  10.5  11.4  11.2  17.2  12.5  6.7  12.2  12.2 
higher eduation 
(isced=6)  21.4  25.5  19.8  24.2  11.2  12.4  14.6  15.7  18.8  17.9  6.5  13.7  17.8 
… contd.    26 
… contd.  
 





































                         
FT employed  42.6  44.9  52.7  44.5  5.9  37.4  20.6  17.0  44.6  27.4  3.5  29.4  30.9 
PT employed  2.0  1.5  2.4  0.7  1.3  3.5  13.5  19.3  12.7  12.4  3.6  4.6  8.1 
self employed  7.3  7.7  10.8  9.4  4.8  4.8  2.7  3.1  2.5  3.7  0.8  2.6  4.9 
not employed  25.7  33.0  10.5  22.4  83.8  6.6  42.5  46.0  15.9  35.9  88.0  13.3  34.7 
unemployed  6.6  5.1  9.2  13.9  1.9  7.8  5.7  4.8  8.9  12.5  1.6  6.4  6.1 
civil servants  5.2  6.0  5.8  7.2  0.9  3.1  2.7  3.1  3.8  2.9  0.6  2.5  3.9 
in voc. training  8.3  0.6  5.3  0.8  0.1  31.6  7.5  0.7  7.9  2.0  0.3  36.5  7.9 
irregular work  2.4  1.3  3.4  1.1  1.3  5.2  4.8  6.1  3.7  3.4  1.7  4.8  3.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Regional 
characteristics  
                         
% in East Germany  19.0  17.9  23.2  23.5  18.7  19.0  18.7  17.7  22.7  19.6  18.6  19.2  18.8 
% City (>500.000)   15.1  12.6  20.2  22.6  13.6  17.6  16.4  13.0  19.7  22.6  18.2  20.6  15.8 
Inheritance                           
% recent inheritance 
(since 1997)  4.1  4.0  5.2  3.3  7.1  3.9  4.8  4.6  7.3  3.6  5.5  4.6  4.5 
Amount inheritance 
(median, in €)  15,339  15,339  20,452  20,452  25,565  35,790  12,782  12,782  10,226  12,782  15,339  12,782  15,339 
% expected 
inheritance  15.4  12.9  21.3  11.4  3.9  21.9  11.8  12.3  18.1  10.3  2.2  15.3  13.5 
n per implicate 
(unweighted)   12,199  7,423  977  521  252  2,339  12,756  7,461  1,048  800  1,013  1,927  24,955 
N in 1.000 
(weighted)  31,391  18,353  2,701  2,005  958  7,375  35,777  18,651  3,015  3,213  4,741  6,156  67,168 
Gender specific 
Population Share, %  100.0  58.5  8.6  6.4  3.1  23.5  100.0  52.1  8.4  9.0  13.3  17.2  -- 
Overall Population 
Share in %  46.7  27.3  4.0  3.0  1.4  11.0  53.3  27.8  4.5  4.8  7.1  9.2  100.0 
Source: SOEP 2002.   27 
Table 2: Net wealth by gender and marital status¹, Germany 2002 
 
  Male  Female 










wed  Single 
Net wealth (nominal)                                     
mean, in €  97,378  130,648  61,636  63,570  120,142  33,908  67,373  83,722  35,425  33,761  102,192  24,214 
median, in €  19,757  53,994  6,500  5,170  26,707  414  10,045  35,094  4,057  1,040  12,940  0 
relative wealth 
position 
120  161  76  78  148  42  83  103  44  41  126  30 
% share wealth = 0  21.3  11.9  22.7  23.9  21.5  43.2  27.0  17.9  27.6  39.8  26.5  47.8 
% share wealth < 0  6.4  5.4  9.0  17.4  0.2  5.8  4.5  4.3  9.2  7.9  1.1  3.6 
Quintile shares                         
bottom  -1.6  -1.4  -2.2  -5.8  0.0  -1.7  -2.1  -2.4  -7.0  -2.6  -0.2  -1.8 
2  0.5  2.0  0.3  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.3  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 
3  4.5  8.5  2.6  2.0  6.9  0.7  3.8  8.8  2.4  1.2  3.8  0.5 
4  17.7  19.0  10.6  13.1  23.4  7.3  19.8  23.1  10.6  10.6  22.6  6.3 
top  78.9  71.9  88.8  90.8  68.4  93.6  78.3  69.1  93.9  90.8  73.4  95.0 
Inequality                         
Gini*  0.749  0.661  0.843  0.899  0.675  0.894  0.775  0.699  0.948  0.875  0.715  0.911 
GE(2)*  1.57  1.07  2.79  2.74  1.05  4.35  1.93  1.45  4.15  3.24  1.31  5.12 
p90/p50  11.69  5.14  25.02  33.96  11.50  169.65  18.01  5.86  24.64  99.40  19.67  n.d. 
p75/p50  5.40  2.68  6.64  9.77  5.67  35.40  8.77  3.19  6.01  22.97  10.17  n.d. 
                         
n per implicate 
(unweighted)   12,199  7,423  977  521  252  2,339  12,756  7,461  1,048  800  1,013  1,927 
N in 1.000 (weighted)  31,391  18,353  2,701  2,005  958  7,375  35,777  18,651  3,015  3,213  4,741  6,156 
Gender specific Pop. 
Share, %  100.0  58.5  8.6  6.4  3.1  23.5  100.0  52.1  8.4  9.0  13.3  17.2 
Overall Pop. Share, %  46.7  27.3  4.0  3.0  1.4  11.0  53.3  27.8  4.5  4.8  7.1  9.2 
* 1% Topcoding (p99[implicate A]=925.000) 
Note: Calculations are based on multiply imputated data 
¹Each cell gives the estimate derived from multiply imputed data together with the upper and lower bound of a 95% confidence interval (in italics). 
Source: SOEP 2002.   28 











male female male female male female male female male female male female
 total married cohabiting divorced/sep. widowed single


















¹Estimates derived from multiply imputed data together with a 95% confidence interval (mean in 2002 euros). 
Source: German SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations.  
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Table 3a: Distribution of different couple-headed household sharing type  
by wealth quantiles 
Wealth 
quantile  Sharing Type    
   -1  0  1  9  Total 
1  22.1  8.8  22.0  47.1  100 
2  30.7  14.8  54.5     100 
3  28.6  20.5  50.9     100 
4  25.8  17.4  56.8     100 
5  25.0  14.4  60.7     100 
Total  26.4  15.1  48.8  9.7  100 
Note: 
-1 = Female-in-charge:  Woman’s wealth exceeds man’s wealth in a couple-headed household 
0 = Equal sharing among partners in a couple-headed household 
1 = Male-in-charge: Man’s wealth exceeds woman’s wealth in a couple-headed household 
9 = No wealth in a couple-headed household 
Source: SOEP 2002. 
 
Table 3b: Average wealth gap in couple-headed household 
by sharing type and wealth quantiles 
Wealth 
quantile 
Sharing Type   
-1  0  1  9  Total 
1  -16039  0  10396  -15  -1261 
2  -9370  0  12836    4111 
3  -38344  0  43569    11209 
4  -67742  0  80748    28374 
5  -160458  0  227005    97689 
Total  -56799  0  88113  -15  27967 
Source: SOEP 2002. 
 
Table 3c: Average wealth of female in couple-headed household  
by sharing type and wealth quantiles 
Wealth 
quantile 
Sharing Type   
-1  0  1  9  Total 
1  2459  -8498  -9436  7  -2280 
2  15290  10815  4682    8850 
3  66688  50172  27580    43396 
4  139964  105425  68431    93331 
5  346941  298062  165269    229689 
Total  111309  95395  62935  7  74480 
Source: SOEP 2002. 
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Table 3d: Average wealth of male in couple-headed household 
by sharing type and wealth quantiles 
Income 
quantile 
Sharing Type    
-1  0  1  9  Total 
1  -13580  -8498  960  -7  -3541 
2  5919  10815  17518     12961 
3  28344  50172  71149     54605 
4  72222  105425  149180     121705 
5  186483  298062  392273     327378 
Total  54509  95395  151048  -7  102447 
Source: SOEP 2002.  
 
Table 3e: Prevalance of homeowners 
by sharing type and wealth quantiles 
Wealth 
quantile 
Sharing Type    
-1  0  1  9  Total 
1  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.01  0.04 
2  0.09  0.22  0.10     0.11 
3  0.44  0.77  0.64     0.61 
4  0.63  0.99  0.90     0.85 
5  0.70  0.97  0.92     0.87 
Total  0.38  0.67  0.60  0.01  0.50 
Source: SOEP 2002.  
 
 
Table 4: Relative gender wealth gap (men/women) based on average wealth holdings by 
marital status, Germany 2002 
 









Housing  1.09  1.14  1.17  1.39  1.22  1.03 
Other Property  1.46  1.54  2.75  1.73  0.57  1.34 
Financial assets  1.36  1.54  0.96  2.19  1.34  1.22 
Insurance/ Private 
pensions  2.01  1.84  1.95  2.58  2.53  1.98 
Business assets  5.52  5.10  8.78  10.00  1.10  7.52 
Tangible assets   1.39  1.43  2.04  1.38  0.85  1.35 
Debt  1.35  1.23  1.43  1.86  0.45  1.43 
Total  1.45  1.56  1.74  1.88  1.18  1.40 
Shaded cells indicate significant deviation (p<=0,05). 
Note: Calculations are based on multiply imputed data 
Source: SOEP 2002. 
 
   31 
 
Table 5: Comparison of chosen OLS regressions of net worth for women and men 
 
  Women        Men         
Variables  coeff.  sig.  std.err.  coeff.  sig.  std.err.    
Length of marriage  242     130  132     158   
Number of marriages  -8116  *  3290  -17711  **  4067   
Immigrant  -44615  **  3831  -38257  **  4766   
Have a partner  -29457  **  5037  -10600     6321   
Lived in East Germany before 1989  -49818  **  3397  -41759  **  4225   
Have kids under 5 years old  -5428     4334  -3158     5348   
Lower vocational education  915     473  664     471   
Upper vocational education  23769  **  3248  15002  **  4699   
University degree  36593  **  4647  36436  **  5908   
Being over 65 years old  50401  **  4957  39855  **  5902   
Have high job autonomy  19969  **  5294  18685  **  4663   
Permanent income  34410  **  8462  200881  **  19285   
Years working full-time  1430  **  174  2673  **  211   
Years working part-time  82006  **  13423  50224  *  20482   
Years unemployed  2333  **  230  1974  *  820   
Not in the labor force  -275     756  369     995   
Labor market experience missing  1443  **  189  2468  **  379   
Father with higher education  33002  **  5943  6725     7272   
Mother with higher education  -7842     14967  3764     20243   
Parent with higher education  -3929     19461  -3280     25015   
Recent inheritance (after 1992)  51231  **  4431  58125  **  5807   
"Old" inheritance (1949 till 1992)  49182  **  5194  66878  **  5680   
Permanent income squared  -9223  **  1894  -46318  **  3621   
Permanent income cube  569  **  106  2630  **  177   
Constant  21114  **  7859  -30432     24063   
Observations  7803        7803         
Adjusted R-squared  0.18        0.27         
Note:* denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; shaded rows indicate the 
gender-specific coefficients are significantly different at the 5% level. 
 
Source: SOEP 2002.  
 
   32 
 
Table 6:  Two-fold Wealth decomposition results (Blinder-Oaxaca) 
 
















wealth if male 
characteristics 
   Amount of gap explained 
with differences in 







       
      79562        98400        107761 
  28199 *        18838 *        9362 *     
          67%        33%     










  Amount of gap explained 
with differences in 
characteristics + 
unexplained portion 





Amount of gap explained 







       
      79562        125200        107761 
  28199 *        45638 *        -17439 *     
          162%        -62%     
Note: Men are the reference group.                   
Note * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 10% level  
(1). Differences arising from different conditional mean functions.               
 
Source: SOEP 2002.  
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Table 7: Three-fold Wealth decomposition results (Blinder-Oaxaca) 
 
Three-fold decomposition                            
  
Wealth gap  Average 
wealth 
Amount of gap due 
to differences in 
characteristics  
Women's av. 
wealth if male 
characteristics 














       
                         
Women    79562    98400    80961      107761  Men 
                         
   28199 *    18838 *    -17439 *    26801 *       
       67%    -62%    95%     
Note: Men are the reference group.                     
Source: SOEP 2002.  
   34 
 
Table 8: Three-fold Wealth decomposition results (Juhn-Murphy-Pierce) 
 






Amount of gap 
explained with 
differences in  
characteristics 
Women's av. wealth if 
men's characteristics 















     
                       
Women    79562    125034    107595    107761  Men 
                       
JMP  28199    45472    -17439    166      
       161%    -62%    0%      
Women    79562    98400    80961    107761  Men 
                       
Oaxaca  28199 *    18838 *    -17439 *    26801 *      
       67%    -62%    95%      
Note: Male group coefficients as the reference group.                         
Source: SOEP 2002.  
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10th  0  49780  -32249  -17531   
           
25th  3950  31266  -19683  -7633   
  100  792  -498  -193   
           
50th  18250  36254  -9596  -8408   
  100  199  -53  -46   
           
75th  32500  46525  -16480  2455   
  100  143  -51  8   
           
90th  67959  62288  -13837  19508   
   100  92  -20  29    
           
P90-P10  67959  12508  18412  37039   
  100  18  27  55   
           
P90-P50  49709  26034  -4241  27916   
  100  52  -9  56   
           
P50-P10  18250  -13526  22653  9123   
  100  -74  124  50   
           
P75-P25  28550  15259  3203  10088   
   100  53  11  35    
       
Note: Men as the reference group; values in parenthesis give the share of the wealth gap which can be attributed 
to differences in characteristics, differences in coefficients, and the unexplained part, respectively. 
Source: SOEP 2002.  
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10th  0  0  0  0  0  0 
se  0  6229  5673  578  601  12501 
             
25th  3950  3946  904  154  -54  -1000 
se  934  1060  706  46  978  1129 
%  100  100  23  4  -1  -25 
             
50th  18250  34002  3721  560  -533  -19500 
se  2558  39329  5268  4536  5331  51502 
%  100  186  20  3  -3  -107 
             
75th  32500  1629  -11660  -4951  -17339  64821 
se  3663  64119  7279  1400  1977  65798 
%  100  5  -36  -15  -53  199 
             
90th  67959  85226  7862  1950  140  -27220 
se  7682  62465  26109  888  9598  70097 
%  100  125  12  3  0  -40 
             
P50-P10  18250  34002  3721  560  -533  -19500 
se  2558  37901  6575  4468  5304  49666 
%  100  186  20  3  -3  -107 
             
P75-P25  28550  -2317  -12564  -5105  -17285  65821 
Se  3268  63646  7429  1418  2292  65249 
%  100  -8  -44  -18  -61  231 
             
P90-P50  49709  51225  4141  1390  673  -7720 
se  6264  54551  25231  4599  10490  69153 
%  100  103  8  3  1  -16 
                    
 
Note: values in parentheses give the share of the wealth gap attributable to the various factors.  
Source: SOEP 2002.  
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9.  Appendix 
 
Appendix A: The decomposition methods  
 
All decomposition analyses in this paper were performed using Stata© (version 9.2). The 
procedures used are ―OAXACA.DO‖, ―JMPIERCE.DO‖ (by Ben Jann) and 
―DECOMPOSE2.DO‖ generously provided by Vincent Hildebrand for the DFL 
decomposition.  
 
Appendix A.1: The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
 
The general specification for the Oaxaca decomposition is the following: 
 
] )][ ( ) ( [ ] )[ ( )] ( ) ( [
) , ( W M W M W M W W W M W M X X X X X                     
III II I
W M    
) , (   
 
j ) (  is the conditional mean function for j=Woman, Man and 
j  -coefficients for j-group and 
j X characteristics of j group.  In this three-fold decomposition, the first component expresses 
the composition effect in the gap that comes from the differences in the mean outcome based 
on characteristics X between group M and W, the second is the effect due to differences in 
coefficients (this is the estimated effects) between these two groups, and the third term is the 
interaction term of the two effects. It must be kept in mind that the estimated coefficient effect 
commonly known as ―discrimination‖ will be incorrect if there are characteristics that affect 
the explanatory variable (in this case wealth), but have been omitted from the regression
9 —the 
so-called omitted variable problem.  Others who believe that there is prevalent discrimination 
and that the magnitude of discrimination is greater than the coefficient effect itself argue that 
even differences in qualifications and credentials may be the result of pre-market 
discrimination—the so-called included variable problem. 
 
Depending on which group (either M or W) we consider as the reference group, we can specify 
alternative two-fold decompositions: 
If we assume M to be the reference group (or the non-discriminatory group) or the group 
whose coefficient structure prevails (in our case, the wealth function), the ―explained‖ part of 
the differential will be the sum of components I and III and the ―unexplained‖ portion will be 
equal to component II.  
 
] )[ ( )] ( ) ( [
) , ( W M W M W M W M X X X              
 
An alternative decomposition of the group differential would be to specify W to be the 
reference, non-discriminatory group. Assuming that the coefficient structure from group W 
prevails, the ―explained‖ part of the differential will be equal to component I and the 
―unexplained‖ component will be the sum of II and III. 
 
] )[ ( )] ( ) ( [
) , ( W M M W W M W M X X X              
 
                                                 
9 In this case the degree of discrimination would be over-estimated as the coefficients are the sum of 
discrimination and differences in unobserved skills.   38 
Appendix A.2: The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition 
 
    Following closely on Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) the framework is the following: 
 
 First, a simple model is specified for the two groups 
 
        j j j j U X Y     
 
where  j Y  are the vectors of the values of the dependent variable in two samples,  j X  are the 
data matrices (observable quantities),  j  are the vectors of estimated coefficients (observable 
prices) and  j U  are the residuals (unobservables, i.e., unmeasured prices and quantities). 
W M j ,  (men and women, respectively). 
 
Let  (.) j F  denote the cumulative distribution functions of the residuals for group  . ,W M j   
Then the residual gap is thought to consist of two components: an individual’s percentile in the 
residual distribution  i p , and the distribution function of the wealth equation residuals  (.) j F . 
For example, take 
 
  ) | ( ij ij j ij x u F p   
 to be the percentile of an individual residual in the residual distribution of model  . i  
    By definition we can write 
 
      ) | (
1
ij ij i ij x p F u
  , where  (.)
1 
j F is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function 
for group  . j  
 
Next, let us assume  (.) F  to be the reference residual distribution (e.g., the average residual 
distribution over both samples) and   an estimate of benchmark coefficients (e.g., the 
coefficients from a pooled model over the whole sample).  
Using this framework, we can reconstruct hypothetical outcome distributions with any of the 
components held fixed. We can then determine 
1.  hypothetical outcomes with varying quantities between the groups and fixed prices 
(coefficients) and a fixed residual distribution as 
 
         ) | (
1 ) 1 (
ij ij ij ij x p F x y
     
 
      2. hypothetical outcomes with varying quantities and varying prices and fixed residual 
distribution as 
 
         ) | (
1 ) 2 (
ij ij j ij ij x p F x y
     
      3. outcomes with varying quantities, varying prices and a varying residual distribution as 
 
         ) | (
1 ) 3 (
ij ij j j ij ij x p F x y
     
 
These last outcomes are actually equal to the originally observed values, i.e.: 
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        ij j ij ij ij u x y y    
) 3 (  
 
Let a capital letter stand for a summary statistic of the distribution of the variable denoted by 
the corresponding lower-case letter. For instance, Y may be the mean or the interquartile range 
of the distribution of y. The differential  W M Y Y  can then be decomposed as 
 
                     )] ( ) [( )] ( ) [( ] [
) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 3 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
W M W M W M W M W M W M Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  
U P Q T      
 
    Where T is the total difference; Qcan be attributed to differences in observable quantities; 
P to differences in observable prices, and U to differences in unobservable quantities and 
prices. This last component not only captures the effect of unmeasured prices, and the effect of 
the differences in the distribution of unmeasured characteristics (e.g., one of the unmeasured 
characteristics is more important for men or women for generating wealth), but also 
measurement error (e.g., men and women report wealth differently). 
 
The major advantage of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce framework is that it allows us to look at how 
differences in characteristics affect the entire wealth distribution and not just the variance. We 
can identify how differences in the distribution affect other inequality measures or how the 
effects on inequality are different below and above the mean. 
 
 
Appendix A.3: The DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux (DFL) decomposition 
 
In their decomposition, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux use a semiparametric decomposition 
approach and avoid making parametric assumptions about the conditional mean function. 
Instead they use reweighting techniques and consider comparisons of probability density 
functions such as in the case of differences in wealth between men and women: 
 
) ( ) (
) , ( w g w g g
W M W M    , where  (.)
j g is the marginal distribution of wealth wfor group j ;  
for an observation with characteristics  x  and it can be expressed via 
  dx x h x w f w g ) ( ) | ( ) ( .  The conditional distribution  .) | (. f  can be thought of as being 
analogous to an estimated regression line and the marginal density of  x , (.) h to the vector of 
characteristics.  
Next, we can specify each density separately by gender: 
     dx i j x h x w f i j w g w g
j j ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) ( , where ) , ( , women men F M j  . 
With this we can specify various counterfactual densities. 
For example, 
What would be the wealth distribution of women if they had the characteristics of men 
         dx x F j x h x w f dx M j x h x w f F j w g w g
W W W
CF ) ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) (  
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i j x h


  then using Bayes’ Rule:    40 
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  , 
 where unlike  ) | ( i j x h   each of the components can easily be estimated  (e.g., survey-
weighted logits) and  ) | ( x i j P  is the probability that a randomly selected individual with 
characteristics  x belongs to groupiif individuals from both groups are pooled in a common 
population and  ) ( i j P  is the probability that a randomly selected individual belongs to group 
j in a pooled population.  ) (w g
j can be estimated using Kernel density estimators. 
In this case the decomposition would be the following: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (




M W M W M g g g g w g w g g         
The second component would express differences due to characteristics and the first would 
capture the unobservables. 
Another question we could ask is: 
1.  What would the wealth distribution of men be if they had the characteristics of women 
 
        dx x M j x h x w f dx F j x h x w f M j w g w g
M M M
CF ) ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) (
1  
The decomposition would then be the following: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (




M W M W M g g g g w g w g g         with the first component capturing the 
differences due to characteristics and the second due to unobservables. 
In our case, we partition the vector of characteristics into four groups  } , , , { d i e l x  and we 
reweight the wealth distribution of men (Barsky et al 2002): 
1.  Labor market experience  ) (l  (self-employed
10, not in the labor force, being over 65 
years of age, lifetime experience working full-time, lifetime experience working part-
time, lifetime experience being unemployed, missing information on lifetime labor 
market experience, have high job autonomy, permanent income) 
 
2.  Educational level  ) (e  (no or basic, lower vocational, upper vocational, university) 
3.  Intergenerational characteristics  ) (i  (father with higher education, mother with higher 
education, parent with higher education, received a recent inheritance (since 1992), 
received an inheritance in the past (1949 to 1992)) 
4.  Demographic characteristics  ) (d  (have a partner, length of marriage, number of 
marriages, immigrant or German national coming from abroad, lived in East Germany 
before 1989, have children under the age of five) 
Our decomposition can then be written in the following way 

g
















j(w |l,e,i,d, j  i)hl|eid (l |e,i,d, j  i)he|id(e |i,d, j)hi|d(i |d, j)hd(d | j)dldedidd
d 
 
                                                 
10 We exclude the self-employed from the final sample.   41 
Next, we follow the methodology of Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006) and Gibson et al 
(2007) and create several counterfactuals: 
1.  What would the wealth distribution of males be if they had women’s labor market 
experience 
         

d




dldedidd M j d h M j d i h M j d i e h F j d i e l h M j d i e l w f
g
) | ( ) , | ( ) , , | ( ) , , , | ( ) , , , , | ( | | |
1
 
2.  What would the wealth distribution of males be if they had women’s labor market 
experience, and education 
         

d




dldedidd M j d h M j d i h F j d i e h F j d i e l h M j d i e l w f
g
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3.  What would the wealth distribution of males be if they had women’s labor market 
experience, education, and intergenerational characteristics 
         

d




dldedidd M j d h F j d i h F j d i e h F j d i e l h M j d i e l w f
g
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4.  What would the wealth distribution of males be if they had women’s labor market 
experience, education, intergenerational, and demographic characteristics 
         

d




dldedidd F j d h F j d i h F j d i e h F j d i e l h M j d i e l w f
g
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With these we obtain our decomposition and we the appropriate reweighting techniques can 
estimate: 
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [
) ( ) (
4 4 3
3 2 2 1 1
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W
CF CF CF
CF CF CF CF CF
M
W M W M
   
      
   
 
Since the ordering of these factor decompositions matters, we use all possible orderings and the 
presented results are averages across all orderings. 
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Appendix Table B.1: Variable definitions 
 
Variables                      
lmarriage  Length of marriage           
nrmarriages  Number of marriages         
migback  Immigrant             
partner  Have a partner           
loc89east  Lived in East Germany before 1989       
kids04  Have kids under 5 years old         
_Iedu_2  Lower vocational education         
_Iedu_3  Upper vocational education         
_Iedu_4  University degree           
over65  Being over 65 years old         
autonom  Have high job autonomy         
perminc  Permanent income           
expft02  Years working full-time         
exppt02  Years working part-time         
expue02  Years unemployed           
notlabor  Not in the labor force         
expmiss  Labor market experience missing       
hiedu_f  Father with higher education         
hiedu_m  Mother with higher education         
hiedu_p  Parent with higher education         
inheri1  Recent inheritance (after 1992)         
inheri2  "Old" inheritance (1949 till 1992)          
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Appendix Table B.2a: OLS regressions of net worth for men (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
lmarriage  1179.37  1361.23  123.39  125.52  63.57  130.31  135.1  131.63 
  (130.15)**  (132.37)**  (163.53)  (161.38)  (163.51)  (160.11)  (157.74)  (157.80) 
nrmarriages     3473.67  -17710.4  -17586.38  -14400.45  -17655.15  -17430.38  -17710.83 
    (3891.37)  (4215.07)**  (4159.08)**  (4209.56)**  (4128.72)**  (4066.82)**  (4067.25)** 
migback  -68324.5  -51741.5  -44266.6  -36745.25  -41889.8  -46481.29  -38574.23  -38257.07 
  (4943.90)**  (4903.50)**  (4907.51)**  (4872.40)**  (4925.41)**  (4809.10)**  (4765.20)**  (4765.81)** 
partner  -27173.7  -8241.14  -12079.9  -12693.95  -20751.19  -10644.83  -11206.73  -10600.33 
  (5914.27)**  (6593.09)  (6540.52)  (6462.07)*  (6525.59)**  (6410.45)  (6322.40)  (6321.21) 
loc89east  -81562.2  -57449  -52618.6  -49582.42  -65194.88  -46686.09  -43187.44  -41758.72 
  (4269.64)**  (4341.99)**  (4329.69)**  (4290.85)**  (4211.62)**  (4301.91)**  (4255.55)**  (4225.46)** 
kids04  -27857.7  -28780.9  -4742.87  -6028.88  -5921.41  -1734.75  -3176.98  -3158.3 
  (5421.13)**  (5322.93)**  (5538.25)  (5467.71)  (5541.71)  (5424.93)  (5346.17)  (5348.41) 
over65  144.01  1552.51  44.92  248.09  -673.47  359.45  589.23  664.3 
  (470.59)  (469.17)**  (486.55)  (480.96)  (483.25)  (477.98)  (471.67)  (471.07) 
_Iedu_2  18814.46  12725.81  19039.44  16973.13  17626.81  17272.27  14996.91  15002.04 
  (4977.28)**  (4873.71)**  (4866.60)**  (4804.73)**  (4869.55)**  (4765.83)**  (4697.22)**  (4699.20)** 
_Iedu_3  42090.5  34302.14  45000.28  39213.45  40031.95  42565.28  36903.68  36436.1 
  (6233.45)**  (6099.52)**  (6100.77)**  (6041.37)**  (6122.87)**  (5977.66)**  (5908.88)**  (5908.92)** 
_Iedu_4  68295.77  47476.84  60861.58  52226.93  61863.17  48150.37  40145.02  39854.65 
  (6016.62)**  (5971.40)**  (5999.50)**  (5998.50)**  (6042.75)**  (5917.75)**  (5900.51)**  (5902.05)** 
autonom  59211.07  27685.92  33932.91  35139.34  50487.69  17992.15  19047.11  18684.8 
  (4599.06)**  (4774.27)**  (4741.80)**  (4683.67)**  (4625.87)**  (4730.58)**  (4663.19)**  (4663.29)** 
perminc     58213.75  58665.44  57705.88  21630.21  503796.7  575168.4  200881 
    (2939.99)**  (3115.87)**  (3080.49)**  (1863.39)**  (139394.70)**  (137525.20)**  (19285.88)** 
zeroinc     564944.3  567262.9  551733.7     982839.3  1168524    
    (37337.42)**  (38027.75)**  (37801.62)**    (431061.50)*  (425113.80)**   
expft02        2911.73  2705.58  2690.23  2892.37  2643.43  2672.84 
      (217.16)**  (215.75)**  (218.67)**  (212.85)**  (211.16)**  (210.98)** 
expmiss        67989.16  75942.2  102466.1  44419.84  50474.27  50224 
      (21154.82)**  (20899.92)**  (21102.57)**  (20754.99)*  (20473.55)*  (20481.97)* 
exppt02        2604.42  2152.9  1045.08  2352.84  1901.47  1974.2 
         (848.55)**  (838.37)*  (846.22)  (831.56)**  (820.14)*  (820.06)* 
expue02        1493.02  1692.9  -1254.84  -13.5  71.55  369.49 
      (1025.86)  (1012.65)  (1005.74)  (1015.22)  (1000.58)  (995.12) 
notlabor        2647.52  2618.76  2002.12  2447.93  2392.21  2468.02 
      (392.20)**  (387.06)**  (389.95)**  (385.39)**  (379.71)**  (378.87)** 
hiedu_f           15472.44  28384.14     6084.02  6725.46 
        (7423.29)*  (7470.15)**    (7273.00)  (7272.32) 
hiedu_m           1314.63  741.41     3525.15  3764.24 
        (20702.19)  (20982.36)    (20234.58)  (20242.92) 
hiedu_p           6187.48  -5564     -3516.33  -3280.07 
        (25577.56)  (25910.91)    (25004.54)  (25014.93) 
inheri1           54819.06  56873.11     58446.4  58125.23 
        (5936.16)**  (6014.81)**    (5806.15)**  (5807.42)** 
inheri2           64082.74  63213.26     67249.93  66877.95 
        (5806.58)**  (5884.86)**    (5678.91)**  (5679.69)** 
inc2                 -77287.59  -85772.65  -46317.75 
            (14995.86)**  (14803.11)**  (3620.75)** 
inc3                 3674.2  3996.8  2629.66 
            (534.42)**  (527.85)**  (176.85)** 
Constant  66559.88  -524794  -599975  -593793.6  -221312.4  -1002938  -1193379  -30432.09 
  (5541.93)**  (30471.44)**  (33712.90)**  (33295.98)**  (21674.91)**  (429784.10)*  (423768.10)**  -24062.54 
Observations  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.15  0.19  0.21  0.23  0.21  0.24  0.27  0.27 
Note:* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level         
Source: SOEP 2002 
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Appendix Table B.2b: OLS regressions of net worth for women (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
lmarriage  1024.25  1036.74  261.14  241.67  239.62  249.22  230.35  241.53 
  (99.55)**  (103.83)**  (131.93)*  -129.83  -129.94  -131.54  -129.48  -129.53 
nrmarriages  3983.69  -6766.83  -7177.72  -6440.38  -7763.13  -8109.06  -8115.71 
    (3113.63)  (3346.90)*  (3293.87)*  (3290.76)  (3339.72)*  (3287.66)*  (3289.92)* 
migback  -57630.47  -57942.24  -50496.54  -45171.9  -45824.98  -49307.4  -44040.14  -44615.19 
  (3845.73)**  (3864.34)**  (3877.40)**  (3838.96)**  (3838.23)**  (3868.93)**  (3831.67)**  (3830.64)** 
partner  -29081.36  -26273.55  -27692.74  -29562.35  -27646.02  -27268.57  -29109.73  -29456.88 
  (4498.28)**  (5111.33)**  (5124.95)**  (5047.19)**  (5025.48)**  (5110.16)**  (5034.16)**  (5036.61)** 
loc89east  -62168.82  -60859  -54471.22  -52617.09  -52865.19  -50771.9  -49123.29  -49818.45 
  (3206.53)**  (3255.32)**  (3426.17)**  (3375.03)**  (3377.21)**  (3451.87)**  (3401.09)**  (3397.38)** 
kids04  -21457  -18701.7  -3956.72  -8022.65  -10160.25  -1588.83  -5759.57  -5428.38 
  (4141.32)**  (4212.53)**  (4383.72)  (4320.97)  (4286.81)*  (4393.42)  (4332.11)  (4334.02) 
over65  1090.32  1425.17  455.46  664.99  434.36  687.65  878.86  915.26 
  (454.15)*  (461.28)**  (478.88)  (471.64)  (468.00)  (479.52)  (472.36)  (472.57) 
_Iedu_2  23850.11  23699.66  27556.39  23571.45  24107.54  28213.92  24247.19  23768.68 
  (3276.58)**  (3291.28)**  (3298.19)**  (3254.76)**  (3254.35)**  (3291.05)**  (3248.68)**  (3247.92)** 
_Iedu_3  35586.91  35476.23  44632.35  37853.77  39204.02  43641.04  37037.49  36592.68 
  (4604.64)**  (4654.36)**  (4707.50)**  (4652.54)**  (4642.48)**  (4700.14)**  (4646.07)**  (4647.46)** 
_Iedu_4  57505.34  56955.07  66003.97  53605.51  55100.38  63017.82  51154.58  50401.36 
  (4761.87)**  (4811.33)**  (4877.01)**  (4939.89)**  (4927.91)**  (4898.14)**  (4958.27)**  (4956.81)** 
autonom  26091.63  24733.64  27264.37  27489.93  31112.86  17450.15  18248.53  19968.92 
  (5128.05)**  (5282.35)**  (5245.84)**  (5162.55)**  (5075.63)**  (5399.47)**  (5314.20)**  (5294.09)** 
perminc     3861.35  3625.2  3797.16  -1531.19  210850.6  202634.9  34409.89 
    (1405.23)**  (1522.20)*  (1498.78)*  (477.80)**  (50514.14)**  (49813.47)**  (8462.08)** 
zeroinc     51212.75  50227.54  50079.31     459353.3  445005.6    
    (13073.22)**  (13560.58)**  (13352.82)**    (131687.60)**  (129859.00)**   
expft02        1510.98  1427.63  1510.17  1532.98  1447.12  1430.37 
      (176.86)**  (174.68)**  (173.43)**  (176.43)**  (174.29)**  (174.35)** 
expmiss        74982.17  82049.11  85234.28  74771.73  81709.42  82005.66 
      (13661.36)**  (13454.62)**  (13439.06)**  (13616.15)**  (13413.66)**  (13422.65)** 
exppt02        2418.59  2127.19  2096.76  2668.05  2362.66  2332.56 
         (230.58)**  (228.02)**  (228.07)**  (232.42)**  (229.88)**  (229.87)** 
expue02        -620.86  -785.1  -1148.46  -106.51  -304.07  -274.87 
      (765.35)  (753.24)  (747.61)  (767.90)  (755.92)  (756.39) 
notlabor        1570.48  1421.61  1337.41  1578.53  1429.12  1442.85 
      (191.20)**  (188.86)**  (187.67)**  (190.72)**  (188.43)**  (188.52)** 
hiedu_f           33751.01  34548.15     32281.84  33001.5 
        (5956.53)**  (5957.73)**    (5943.02)**  (5943.41)** 
hiedu_m           -6411.22  -6603.15     -5485.04  -7842.25 
        (15001.76)  (15014.26)    (14972.85)  (14967.36) 
hiedu_p           -4887.54  -6417.6     -6619.89  -3928.87 
        (19504.51)  (19516.61)    (19463.17)  (19460.74) 
inheri1           51744.07  51517.35     51223.24  51231.05 
            (4440.93)**  (4444.25)**     (4428.08)**  (4431.13)** 
inheri2           49314.67  49279.3     49478.4  49181.85 
        (5206.37)**  (5210.74)**    (5191.22)**  (5194.08)** 
inc2                 -31253.17  -29889.49  -9223.15 
            (6409.68)**  (6320.67)**  (1893.70)** 
inc3                 1462.81  1396  568.73 
            (267.35)**  (263.63)**  (106.00)** 
Constant  52764.24  10131.79  -27474.47  -28165.55  20145.55  -437019.8  -423413.5  21114.25 
  (3855.02)**  (13527.82)  (15324.07)  (15091.77)  (7869.94)*  (131786.90)**  (129957.10)**  (7858.71)** 
Observations  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803  7803 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.12  0.13  0.15  0.17  0.17  0.15  0.18  0.18 
Note: * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level         
Source: SOEP 2002 
 